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The Limitations of Sovereignty from Nuremberg to Sarajevo
Henry T. King, Jr.*
Growing up as a small boy in Connecticut in the 1930's, I profited
from Sunday night dinner sessions at which my father discussed
with us the major issues of the day. One of these discussions in the
early 1930's dealt with the question of how do we stop wars? Father
raised the question and then asked us if we had any thoughts on the
answer. A long silence ensued, which was unusual because we were a
voluble family. Finally, father supplied his own answer which ran as
follows: "The people don't want wars. It is their leaders who start
them. To stop wars you have to punish the leaders."
I have thought about that discussion a great deal both then and
afterwards. I had heard a great deal from father and others about the
horrors of World War I. I hoped, as the posters put it, that "They (the
heroes of World War I) shall not have died in vain." Still father's ques-
tion was an intriguing one and I wondered whether his answer was the
right one. I knew that other approaches had not worked.
The question was one that stayed with me and ironically enough
became one of the ruling passions of my life. So much so that by early
in 1946, I had become one of the U.S. prosecutors at Nuremberg.
The interim had seen the coming and going of Adolf Hitler. Hitler
had convinced the German people that their destiny and security lay
with expanded international and domestic German sovereignty. "Le-
bensraum" or living space was the order of the day in Hitler's Ger-
many as he led the country into World War II with the attack on Po-
land and subsequent aggressions culminating in the attack on Russia.
Hitler's invasion of Russia reached its zenith in December 1941 at the
outskirts of Moscow where his armies were stalemated. Thereafter and
particularly after the German surrender at Stalingrad in February
1943, it was pretty much all downhill for Hilter's legions culminating
in the near obliteration of Germany by the Allies. In the later ruins of
shattered Germany, the German people realized that their security was
not to be identified with expanded sovereignty and domination.
After the surrender of the German armies, the question then to be
faced by the Allies was what to do with the German leaders who had
participated with Hitler in his attempts to expand German control and
sovereignty over the entire European continent. Most of Europe lay
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devastated because of Hitler's aggression. This destruction had been
carried out in the name of the German state. Some of the acts commit-
ted were condoned by German law but were clearly contrary to inter-
national law. Could that higher law be used to bring the Nazi leaders
to justice? Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson thought so, and he
prevailed over British leaders and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
Henry Morgenthau who wanted the key Nazis summarily executed.
But ultimately the answer to the question of whether a trial was feasi-
ble lay with Justice Robert H. Jackson who was commissioned on May
2, 1945 by President Truman to plan for the trial of the major Nazi
war criminals.
To appreciate the importance of Jackson's mission I think an ex-
cerpt from his first progress report of June 7, 1945 to President Tru-
man is pertinent. In his progress report he wrote:
We are put under heavy responsibility to see that our behavior
during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought towards a
firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct so as to make
war less attractive to those who have governments and the destinies of
peoples in their power.
Jackson's plan, which was agreed to after very tough negotiations
with the UK, France and Russia, was to identify three types of crimes
for which the Nazis would be tried. These were; 1) crimes against
peace, i.e. the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of
aggression; 2) war crimes - crimes in violation of the laws or customs
of war; and 3) crimes against humanity, for example, murder and ill
treatment of civilians for racial, religious or political reasons in connec-
tion with any other crime within the tribunal's jurisdiction whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
A fourth crime was added - namely, participation in a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the first three crimes. The crimes were set
forth in the so-called London Charter of August 8, 1945, which also
provided that the fact that actions were carried out as heads of state or
responsible officials was no defense; nor was there to be recognized the
defense of superior orders of a government or of a superior.
It should be noted that the German armies surrendered uncondi-
tionally to the Allies on May 8, 1945. There was no sovereign German
government with which they dealt in the surrender arrangements. Since
the surrender was unconditional, the Allies could set its terms and all
the rules under which they would govern Germany at will. This meant
that they were perfectly right in dictating the terms under which the
Nazi leaders would be tried, including the provision that the official
positions of defendants as head of state or holders of high government
office, were not to free them from responsibility or to mitigate their
punishment; nor was the defense of orders from an official or superior
(i.e. Adolf Hitler) to be recognized although under certain circum-
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stances it might be considered in mitigation of punishment. This meant
that the defendants could not hide behind the cloak of German sover-
eignty in justifying their crimes.
A word about the Nuremberg court. The International Military
Tribunal was not a military court-martial and it was certainly no ordi-
nary court. It was a high level tribunal with jurists of great distinction.
It covered crimes which were massive and had no particular location.
The International Military Tribunal was, among other things, con-
cerned with the international laws of war and not the laws of any par-
ticular nation. Violations of these laws are war crimes. The Interna-
tional Military Tribunal's activity replaced individual trials in
individual countries which would have been very fragmented. Indeed, it
was a remarkable collective effort by the nations involved.
Justice Robert Jackson's opening statement for the United States
of America of November 21, 1945 gives us a sense of the importance of
what was transpiring at Nuremberg when he said:
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes
against the peace of this world imposes a grave responsibility. The
wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calcu-
lated; so malignant; and so devastating that civilization cannot toler-
ate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated.
That four great nations flushed with victory and stung with injury,
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive ene-
mies to the judgement of the law is one of the most significant tributes
that power ever paid to reason.
The primary charge at Nuremberg was preparing, initiating, and
waging wars of aggression. This dealt with wars in violation of Ger-
many's treaty obligations to other countries. And the Nuremberg Court
landed hard on those who were the object of this charge. In its holding,
the tribunal held implicitly that the exercise of Germany's sovereignty
did not support the wanton destruction by Germany of other states
through wars of aggression, particularly where Germany's treaty obli-
gations said otherwise. It held that those who schemed to extend Ger-
many's sovereignty beyond the limits of international law were guilty of
major international crimes and that these crimes together with crimes
committed in the course of Germany's aggressions warranted the su-
preme penalty - death (by hanging).
And all the Nuremberg defendants found that - they were to be
judged - not by the law of the sovereign state of Germany, but by a
higher law - international law - whose principles were superior to
Hitler's German law. They found that they could not hide behind the
curtain of German sovereignty in attempting to excuse their crimes and
that the more enduring principles of international law were to deter-
mine their fate. In other words, they found that they were to be judged
as individuals and that they would be punished as individuals for what
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they did in violation of international law. The cloak of German sover-
eignty could not protect them from this responsibility.
In sum, while the Nuremberg law did not outlaw the right of sov-
ereign nations to declare and carry out defensive wars, it did hold ille-
gal and condemn aggressive wars, and it held that the Nazi wars of
aggression were beyond the bounds of international law. Nuremberg
further held that those Nazi officials who during World War II carried
out Hitler's orders calling for violations of the laws and customs of war
were guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It further
found that conformance with the municipal law of Nazi Germany was
no justification for their actions.
So the core of the holding at Nuremberg was that the sovereign
rights of a nation state (i.e. Germany) no longer included the initiation
planning and waging of wars of aggression. In addition, the Nuremberg
holding states that the responsible officials of a state which did so were
punishable under international law.
Nuremberg further held that the local municipal law of the sover-
eign state of Germany provided no cover for individuals who, in the
course of a war of aggression, violated international rules governing the
conduct of warfare. In sum, Nuremberg held that where Hitler's orders
violated international law, those who carried them out were responsible
and punishable under international law. Conceptually, this indeed
meant a severe, but very realistic limitation on the sovereignty of the
German state.
The Nuremberg principles were endorsed by the United Nations
on December 11, 1946 and the principles inherent in the crimes against
humanity count at Nuremberg were implemented and extended by the
United Nations Convention on Genocide which was adhered to by
many nations excluding until fairly recently, the United States. The
adoption of this convention was resisted for many years on sovereignty
grounds by certain members of the United States Senate, but eventu-
ally, under much political pressure, the U.S. Senate ratified the conven-
tion, albeit with some emasculating provisions.
In the early 1950's, there began a drive by some U.N. members to
codify the Nuremberg principles and to implement them on a perma-
nent basis. This project has been carried out by the U.N.'s Interna-
tional Law Commission which has endeavored to develop a code of
crimes against the peace and security of mankind and to draft provi-
sions for an international criminal court. Some countries have thrown
their weight behind this project, but others, including the United
States, up until the current administration, have dragged their feet
feeling, perhaps, that a code in place and fully implemented, might be
used to punish their own national officials. The International Law
Commission is continuing these efforts, but progress in this area is gla-
cial because many nations do not want to cede elements of their sover-
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eignty to make for a more secure world. To be effective, such a code
must apply to all nations and their leaders alike.
Here it will be recalled that when the U.S. took the initiative to
establish the Nuremberg tribunals, its policy promised that the new
international standards would apply to all nations equally.
Justice Jackson put it best:
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants today is the record on which history will judge us to-
morrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our
own lips as well.
It should be pointed out that there are two aspects of this endeavor
- namely, agreement on a code of international criminal conduct which
would define offenses against the peace and security of mankind and
the crafting of a means of enforcement of such a code through an inter-
national criminal court. As evidence of some progress in this area, I do
want to note that in 1991 the International Law Commission did come
up with a first draft of a code of crimes against the peace and security
of mankind. Further, a meeting of the commission in May 1993 dealt
with the structure of an international court and the International Law
Commission has come up with a draft for such a court which, pursuant
to a U.N. General Assembly resolution, has been circulated to the
U.N.'s member states for comment.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein and his military leaders engaged in a
war of aggression against Kuwait. In the course of this aggression, war
crimes and crimes against humanity were carried out on a significant
scale. The parallels to what the Nazis had done from 1939 to 1945
were indeed apparent to the Nuremberg prosecutors, myself included.
Meeting in Washington on March 23, 1991, we called for a trial of
Saddam Hussein and his cohorts by an international tribunal estab-
lished under UN auspices. Such a trial would have had available much
televised evidence to support war crimes charges against Saddam.
Hearings were held on this initiative by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but nothing came of them because of inaction by the exec-
utive branch which had earlier called for the trial and punishment of
Iraqi leaders at the time the UN coalition went to war with Iraq. Ironi-
cally, Iraq's civilian population has become the main victim of both
economic sanctions and missile attacks while its leader, who is allegedly
responsible for every war crime in the book, remains head of Iraq's
government and has gone unpunished for all the destruction he
wrought.
In retrospect, it seems to me that a golden moment was lost in
which a blow for peace and security could have been taken to secure a
better world. The UN and the U.S. were victorious in the Gulf War
against Iraq. We could have taken Saddam Hussein into custody had
we wanted to prolong the war by perhaps a few days. Alternatively, we
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could have tried him in absentia as we did Martin Bormann at Nurem-
berg, and shown him for what he is before the eyes of the world. But
we did nothing; we left him in office to cause more trouble in the world.
The trial of Saddam would have reinvigorated the Nuremberg princi-
ples and the world would have been better for it. Some critics feel that
the reluctance of the Bush Administration to push for a trial of Sad-
dam and Co. was based on a concern that we would expose our leaders
to similar trials in the future. I do not think this concern is realistic,
but if it was a factor, we should know the reasons why.
On May 25, 1993, a more encouraging development on this same
front took place; the United Nations Security Council passed a resolu-
tion calling for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to try per-
sons charged with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. While this ad
hoc tribunal can only deal with crimes committed after January 1,
1991, its creation may be a stepping stone to a permanent court. I am
currently serving as a member of a special ABA committee which is
advising on the implementation of the resolution. The UN resolution
leaned heavily on the definitions of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity as set forth in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment. Like the
International Military Tribunal Charter, it excludes the superior orders
defense. It also specifies punishments for such crimes. Many of the Nu-
remberg trial procedures were incorporated into the UN Resolution.
The UN Resolution itself specified extradition, where possible, as a
means of getting jurisdiction over suspected war criminals. However,
the Resolution did not deal effectively with the question of how sover-
eign states could be forced to turn their leaders over for trial by an
international tribunal, and it does not propose to try these leaders in
absentia. The newly released rules of the tribunal seem to indicate that
the tribunal will rely on support from the UN Security Council in its
efforts to get jurisdiction over suspected war criminals.
The Yugoslavia tribunal will deal only with charges that are paral-
lel to the war crimes and crimes against humanity counts at Nurem-
berg and not with crimes against peace (presumably because of ex post
facto concerns).
Eleven judges have been named to the Yugoslavia war crimes tri-
bunal. Rules of procedure have been agreed upon and monies appropri-
ated for this operation. But, thus far, no indictments have been filed
and no suspected criminals have been apprehended for trial. Delays
have resulted from the resignation of the first designated prosecutor,
the attorney general of Venezuela, whose successor is in the process of
being named. In prosecuting war crimes, the tribunal will apply only
those rules of international humanitarian law which are part of custom-
ary law. The rules of international humanitarian law applicable to
armed conflict are embodied in the 1949 Geneva Convention for the
protection of war victims; the 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws and
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Customs of War on Land; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and the category of "crimes
against humanity" which was first recognized in the charter and judg-
ment of the Nuremberg tribunal.
The statute of the international tribunal covering war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia confers personal jurisdiction over natural per-
sons (Article 6) and territorial jurisdiction over the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. Article 7 establishes individual responsibility for com-
mitting crimes and also for aiding and abetting. It also limits the
defense of superior orders to consideration in mitigation of punishment.
Articles 9 and 16 establish jurisdiction of the tribunal concurrent with
national courts but, at the same time, grant the tribunal a right to re-
quest national courts to defer to the tribunal. The tribunal will have
two trial chambers made up of three judges each and an appeals cham-
ber made up of five judges.
In addition to adopting the Nuremberg approach on the superior
orders defense, the UN Resolution on War Crimes in the former Yugo-
slavia also provided that the fact that actions were carried out as heads
of state or responsible government officials was no defense. But unlike
Nuremberg, it did not authorize the trial of defendants in absentia, but
required that they be tried in their own presence.
This tribunal is at the moment in recess but developments at the
Hague bear watching. On an encouraging note, we should not forget
that a number of the Nuremberg principles (i.e. those relating to the
taking of hostages) have been incorporated into the army field manuals
of the major military powers. These field manuals govern the conduct
of warfare by their armies and in them we see rules of sovereign states
in a sensitive area coinciding with Nuremberg as a backdrop and as a
cohesive force for a parallel approach. Thus, national attitudes have
been influenced and altered constructively by the Nuremberg
proceedings.
The belief that sovereignty brings security is an illusion in today's
world. The German citizens who bought Adolf Hitler's argument that
an expanded sovereign German Reich would be synonymous with
greater security were forever disillusioned when they saw German cities
obliterated and their homes and those of others destroyed. When Ger-
many rose phoenix-like from the ashes of destruction, she became a
power in the drive to establish a European community in which she and
her traditional enemy France, became important partners. They surren-
dered considerable sovereignty to make the institutions of the European
Community work. And they have worked extremely well. There is no
talk of war today between France and Germany and, probably, there
never will be again. This is because both powers exchanged some sover-
eignty for a new system of security in which Germany and France be-
came partners rather than enemies.
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At the same time, it is important to note that the thrust of some of
the Nuremberg principles which affect sovereignty are incorporated
into the German (federal) constitution. For example, the federal consti-
tution states that sovereign powers may be transferred by legislation to
international institutions. Additionally, Article 25 states that the gen-
eral rules of international law shall form a part of and take precedence
over federal rights and duties for inhabitants of the federal territory.
Finally, Article 26 provides that activities tending to disturb the peace-
ful relations between nations and especially the preparation for aggres-
sive war shall be unconstitutional and shall be subject to punishment.
Perhaps other countries might well follow Germany's lead in this
regard. In the larger world we have not been able to create parallels to
the European Community security system on a worldwide basis. But
there are some signs of progress. After the giant step taken at Nurem-
berg, the UN Resolution on the trial of the war criminals in the former
Yugoslavia is a step in the right direction as are the efforts of the UN's
International Law Commission, but much more needs to be done to
ensure real and lasting progress. Such efforts have to have the full sup-
port of the United States which is still the most important power in the
world. Now more than ever we should take a leadership role at the
U.N. in the drive to establish an international criminal court which
would apply a code of crimes against the peace and security of man-
kind. Not only should we support efforts to define such crimes, but we
should be concerned with how suspected offenders could be brought to
the bar of justice and tried for such crimes. The question of how to get
jurisdiction over such offenders and to implement their punishment
needs particular attention but I think these goals are reachable.
So, in today's world the challenge my father laid down so many
years ago remains to be met. Some progress has been made, but it is
not definitive and much needs to be done to make the world free from
aggressive wars and crimes committed during these aggressions. Basi-
cally, sovereign states must submit themselves to a general rule of law
which would prohibit aggressive wars and punish those leaders who
start and carry them out. The key here is sovereignty and how much
we are willing to relinquish to make the world a safer and more secure
place.
I am an idealist. As Edwin Dickinson, the great internationalist
said some years ago:
History teaches that without ideals there can be no progress, only
change. The stars that guide you may never touch with your own
hands, but following them you will reach your destiny.
I think that we have to keep our eyes on the stars. I believe we all have
to tithe a bit for future humanity in an endeavor to create a more se-
cure world in which the rule of law prevails. This has been my life-long
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dream and I have devoted most of my waking hours to it.
There is an old Andalusian song which is sung in Flamenco tav-
erns which runs as follows:
They say that a day
has twenty-four hours.
If it had twenty-seven
I would love you three hours more.
On a personal level I would phrase it for me this way:
They say that a day
has twenty-four hours.
If it had twenty-seven
I would work for a more
secure world three hours more.
SUMMARY
At Nuremberg, for the first time in history, men who had abused
power in violation of international law were held to answer in a court of
law for crimes committed during war in the name of their nation state.
Most of the crimes against humanity as described in the Nuremberg
indictment and subsequent trial were committed by authority of the
law of Nazi Germany. The thrust of the indictment was that the de-
crees of Hitler in Nazi Germany - binding as they were under German
law, were the source of major crimes committed by the defendants. But
the Nuremberg court found that this was only during the war and only
relating to acts concerned with the carrying out of the war. It did not
relate to crimes committed in times of peace. The acts had to relate to
war crimes or aggressive war. Otherwise the concept of national sover-
eignty in this case would have been totally disregarded.
Individuals were held responsible at Nuremberg for initiating and
waging aggressive war and for atrocities connected with or in execution
of war. (Nuremberg established a minimum standard of conduct for
individuals).
Dr. Jahreiss, German defense counsel for Alfred Jodl, summed up
very succinctly what was happening when he said, "What the prosecu-
tion is doing when in the name of the world community as an entity it
desires to have individuals legally sentenced for their decisions regard-
ing war and peace, is destroying the spirit of the state."
The answer in previous years had been the defense of sovereignty
upon which Jahreiss had based his defense. But the IMT held that the
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact swept away whatever justification that
might have been asserted by government leaders as the responsible
heads of state on the ground of sovereignty.
The theory of individual responsibility for initiating and waging an
aggressive war can also be related to the personal responsibility of gov-
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ernment leaders, for crimes against humanity. The tribunal said in its
decision, "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." And fur-
ther, the tribunal said that individuals who have committed criminal
acts under international law cannot shelter themselves behind their offi-
cial positions in order to be free from punishment in appropriate pro-
ceedings. The very essence of the IMT Charter was that individuals
have international duties which transcend their national obligations of
obedience imposed by individual states.
But Nuremberg also meant that an individual charged with a
crime under international law is entitled to a fair trial. And Albert
Speer, a leading defendant at Nuremberg, told me shortly before he
died that he thought that the Nuremberg proceedings were fair and
that justice was done at Nuremberg. Indeed, the Nuremberg ground
rules were fair to both prosecution and defense alike and many of those
involved have commented favorably on the balance shown by the Nu-
remberg Tribunal in conducting the proceedings and in rendering its
judgment in an extremely tight time frame. Yes, justice was indeed
done at Nuremberg.
Two FINAL COMMENTS:
1. What we are really concerned about here is finding a balance
between the recognized right of a society to its independence and the
right of the international community to prevent criminal behavior car-
ried out in the name of nation states. In essence, we are talking about
state sovereignty and its limits. What Nuremberg says is that state sov-
ereignty does not excuse international criminal behavior or prevent jus-
tice from prevailing.
2. We, and future generations, should never be permitted to forget
that Adolf Hitler's massive aggressions carried out for the purpose of
extending the sovereignty of the German state finally resulted in the
near obliteration of Germany from the face of the earth, and that the
post war agreements made by Germany to limit its sovereignty to make
the European Community a workable reality have brought peace, pros-
perity and security to the German people to a degree never achieved
before. This is a lesson of history which should always be with us.
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